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One of the most controversial social policy issues that remains underdiscussed in scholarly 
literature is the sexual autonomy of persons with disabilities. Th is population has faced a 
double set of confl icting prejudices: on one hand, people with disabilities are infantilized 
(as not being capable of having the same range of sexual desires, needs and expectations 
as persons without disabilities), and on the other hand, this population is demonized 
(as being hypersexual, unable to control primitive urges). Although attitudes about the 
capabilities of persons with disabilities are changing for the better, attitudes toward 
persons with disabilities engaging in sexual behavior have remained fi rmly in place for 
centuries. However, the ratifi cation of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) demands we reconsider these attitudes. 
Th is paper will (1) review the history of how legal and social issues regarding 
sexuality have been ignored and trivialized by policy makers and the general public; 
(2) highlight sections of the CRPD that force us to reconsider the scope of this issue; (3) 
off er suggestions as to how states must change domestic policy to comport with CRPD 
mandates; and (4) consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence insights for the 
resolution of these issues.
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I.  Introduction
One of the most controversial social policy issues that remains dramatically under-discussed in scholarly literature is the sexual 
autonomy of persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, 
especially those who are institutionalized. Th is population – always 
marginalized and stigmatized – has traditionally faced a double set 
of confl icting prejudices: on one hand, people with disabilities are 
infantilized (as not being capable of having the same range of sexual 
 A portion of this paper was presented (by MLP) at the Biennial Congress 
of the International Academy of Law and Mental Health, July 2013, 
Amsterdam, Th e Netherlands. Th e authors wish to thank Dr. Maya 
Sabatello for her sharing of Israeli source materials.
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desires, needs and expectations as persons without disabilities), and on the 
other hand, this population is demonized (as being hypersexual, unable 
to control base or primitive urges).1 Although attitudes about the abilities 
and capabilities of persons with disabilities are changing for the better, 
it remains true that, “many people still struggle to accept that mentally 
d isabled individuals engage in s exual activity.”2 Even as the “sexual 
revolution” in the United States recognized sex and sexuality were needs 
rather than simply desires, persons with disabilities were left out of this 
shift in perception.3 Attitudes toward persons with disabilities engaging in 
1. See e.g. Maya Sabatello, “Disability, Human Rights and Global Health: 
Past, Present, Future” in Michael Freeman, Sarah Hawkes & Belinda 
Bennett, eds, Law and Global Health: Current Legal Issues, vol 16 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) (“women with disabilities are … assumed 
to be a-sexual, sexually inactive or else, that their sexuality and fertility 
should be controlled” (emphasis added) at manuscript 8) [Sabatello, 
“Disability, Human Rights and Global Health”]. Compare Doug Jones, 
“Domestic Violence Against Women With Disabilities: A Feminist Legal 
Th eory Analysis” (2007) 2:1 Florida A&M University Law Review 207 
(“[p]erhaps the most signifi cant myth is that women with  disabilities are 
asexual” at 223); Andreas Dimopoulos, “Let’s Misbehave: Intellectual 
Disability and Capacity to Consent to Sex” (paper delivered at the Society 
of Legal Scholars, Faculty of Law, Brunel University, 1 September 2012), 
online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2332259> (discussing the 
“social stereotype for persons with intellectual disability that they should 
not be having sex, that they should be asexual” at 9); Rangita de Silva 
de Alwis, “Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women 
and Children with Disabilities Within an Interrelated Web of Human 
Rights” (2009) 18 Pac Rim L & Pol’y J 293 (women with disabilities are 
especially vulnerable to “the imposition of social stereotypes of asexuality 
and passivity” at 296), to Amy Spady, “Th e Sexual Freedom of Eve: 
A Recommendation for Contraceptive Sterilization Legislation in the 
Canadian Post Re Eve Context” (2008) 25 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 
33 (“[i]t is accepted that many persons with mental disabilities experience 
the same, if not greater, sexual urges as other individuals” at 56).
2. Maura McIntyre,  “Buck v. Bell and Beyond: A Revised Standard to 
Evaluate the Best Interests of  the Mentally Disabled in the Sterilization 
Context” (2007) 1:4 U Ill L Rev 1303 at 1309.
3. Oana Georgiana Girlescu, Sexuality and Disability: An Assessment of 
Practices Under the Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(Master of Laws in Human Rights Th esis, Central European University, 
2012) [unpublished]. See Balázs Tarnai, “Review of Eff ective 
Interventions for Socially Inappropriate Masturbation in Persons with 
Cognitive Disabilities” (2006) 24:3 Sexuality and Disability 151 (quoting 
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sexual behaviour have remained fi rmly in place for centuries; perhaps the 
most famous characterization remains US Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s line in Buck v Bell,4 a case involving sterilization of a 
woman allegedly intellectually disabled: “[t]hree generations of imbeciles 
are enough.”5 People with disabilities, simply put, are frequently stripped 
of their sexuality.6 
Th e ratifi cation of the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)7 demands that we reconsider this 
issue. In light of Convention Articles mandating, inter alia, “respect 
for inherent dignity,”8 the elimination of discrimination in all matters 
the director of a large German institution: ‘‘[s]exual expression is not a 
problem for people with cognitive disabilities – but for those who work 
with them” at 151).
4. 274 US 200 (1927). 
5. Ibid at 207. Th e underpinnings of Holmes’ arguments are eviscerated 
and shredded in Paul A Lombardo, Th ree Generations, No Imbeciles: 
Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2008).  Beyond the scope of this paper are the issues 
that are raised in what is known as “growth attenuation surgery” – when 
parents of young children with severe disabilities choose to have them 
undergo hysterectomies to avoid the onset of menstruation, mastectomies 
to prevent breast development, and the administration of high doses of 
estrogen to ensure that the children remain at a size that would facilitate 
care. See e.g. Alicia R Ouellette, “Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, 
and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons from the Ashley X Case” 
(2008) 8:2 Houston Journal of Health Law and Policy 207 at 210-17 
(discussing the “Ashley X” case); Ravi Malhotra & Katharine Neufeld, 
“Th e Legal Politics of Growth Attenuation” (2013) 34 Windsor Rev Legal 
Soc Issues 105.
6. Michael Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Th eory to Practice (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).
7. 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 [CRPD]; see generally Michael L Perlin, 
International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: When the Silenced 
are Heard (USA: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 143-49 [Perlin, 
International Human Rights].
8. CRPD, supra note 7, Article 3. On how dignity is the fi rst “fundamental 
axiom” upon which the Convention is premised, see Raymond Lang, 
“Th e United Nations Convention on the Right and Dignities for Persons 
with Disability: A Panacea for Ending Disability Discrimination?” (2009) 
3 ALTER: European Journal of Disability Research 266 at 273. On the 
relationship between human dignity and “inner worth,” see Amanda 
Ploch, “Why Dignity Matters: Dignity and the Right (or Not) to 
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related to interpersonal relationships,9 and services in the area of sexual 
and reproductive health,10 it is time for a radical change of perspective 
and attitude in how society views the sexuality, and right to express that 
sexuality, of persons with disabilities. Following the approach already 
adopted in international law, society as a whole must recognize that 
“[b]eing deemed a ‘person’ or sexual is not contingent upon ability.”11 Yet, 
the literature surrounding the sexual autonomy and issues of sexuality that 
people with disabilities continue to confront remains remarkably silent on 
this issue in general,12 and totally silent about the issue we discuss in this 
paper: the CRPD’s impact on the rights to sexual autonomy for persons 
institutionalized because of psychosocial or intellectual disability.13 
Th is subject is particularly nettlesome in light of another reality. 
Rehabilitation from International and National Perspectives” (2012) 44:3 
NYU Int’l L & Pol 887 at 895-96.
9. CRPD, supra note 7, Article 23.
10. Ibid, Article 26.
11. Bethany Stevens, “Structural Barriers to Sexual Autonomy for Disabled 
People” (2011) 38:2 Human Rights 14 at 16; Girlescu, supra note 3 at 16.
12. On how the entire question is often seen as “taboo,” see e.g. Michael 
L Perlin, “‘Make Promises by the Hour’: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and 
Psychiatric Hospitalization” (1997) 46:4 DePaul L Rev 947 [Perlin, 
“Promises by the Hour”] (“[t]he  taboo and stigma attached to sexual 
behaviour is inevitably heightened when it is coupled with and confl ated 
with stereotypes of the meaning of mental disability” at 965); from a 
clinical perspective, see e.g. Eddie McCann, “Th e Expression of Sexuality 
in Persons with Psychosis: Breaking the Taboo” (2000) 32:1 Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 132 [McCann, “Breaking the Taboo”]. 
13. Special issues may be raised in cases of individuals with autism or those 
with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Compare Laura Gilmour, Melike 
Schalomon & Veronica Smith, “Sexuality and ASD: Current State of 
Research” in Vanood E Patel et al, eds, Comprehensive Guide to Autism 
(New York: Springer New York, 2014) 569 at 569 (people with ASD 
have sexual interests and engage in sexual behaviours with others), to 
Laura Gilmour, Melike Schalomon & Veronica Smith, “Sexuality in a 
Community Based Sample of Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder” 
(2012) 6:1 Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders 313 (although 
individuals with ASD display an interest in sex and engage in sexual 
behaviours and showed no signifi cant diff erences in breadth and strength 
of sexual behaviours and comprehension of sexual language when 
contrasted with non-ASD participants, nonetheless, a higher rate of 
asexuality was found among individuals with ASD).
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One of the authors (MLP) has spent over 40 years involved with mental 
disability law as a legal practitioner, advocate, academic and scholar. Th e 
other author (AJL) has just embarked on her career as a lawyer on behalf 
of these populations. Th rough our careers, one thing has been clear. 
Nothing has ever touched as raw of a nerve as our discussion concerning 
whether persons with mental disabilities have a right to voluntary sexual 
interaction, especially when such individuals are institutionalized.14 Why 
is this? And how does this relate to “sanism” – an irrational prejudice 
of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that 
cause and are refl ected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry15 – that permeates all aspects of mental 
disability law and aff ects all participants in the mental disability law 
system: litigants, fact fi nders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses.16 
Consider this conclusion: 
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs of the 
mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as possessing an animalistic 
hypersexuality, which warrants the imposition of special protections and 
14. For a discussion of hostile audience reaction to presentations about this 
topic, see Michael L Perlin, “‘Limited in Sex, Th ey Dare’: Attitudes 
Toward Issues of Patient Sexuality” (2005) 26:3 American Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry 25. Eddie McCann has speculated that this may 
be because of a fear that simply addressing this issue “will be seen as 
actively encouraging widespread institutional promiscuity”; see McCann, 
“Breaking the Taboo”, supra note 12 at 133. On how institutionalization 
may be a “compounding” problem in this context, see McCann “Breaking 
the Taboo”, supra note 12 at 133.
15. Th e word “sanism” was, to the best of our  knowledge, coined by Dr. 
Morton Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, “Th e Right to Treatment: 
Some Comments on Its Development” in Frank Ayd, ed, Medical, Moral 
and Legal Issues in Mental Health Care (Balitmore: Williams & Wilkins, 
1974) 97 at 105; see also Koe v Califano, 573 F (2d) 761 at 764, n 12 (2d 
Cir 1978). We believe it best explains the roots of our attitudes towards 
persons with mental disabilities. See e.g. Michael L Perlin, “‘Half-Wracked 
Prejudice Leaped Forth’: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental 
Disability Law Developed as it Did” (1999) 10 J Contemp Legal Issues 
3; see generally, e.g. Michael L Perlin, Th e Hidden Prejudice: Mental 
Disability on Trial (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 
2000).
16. On the way that sanism aff ects lawyers’ representation of clients, see 
Michael L Perlin, “‘You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks’: Sanism in 
Clinical Teaching” (2003) 9:2 Clinical L Rev 683 at 689-90.
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limitations on their sexual behavior to stop them from acting on these 
“primitive” urges.  By focusing on alleged “diff erentness,” we deny their 
basic humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual needs. By 
asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow ourselves to censor their 
feelings and their actions. By denying their ability to show love and aff ection, 
we justify this disparate treatment.17 
Th e foregoing observation may best explain the diffi  culty so many of 
us have in dealing with the question of the sexual autonomy of persons 
with disabilities, and explains why policymakers are often unable to 
approach such issues thoughtfully, even-handedly, and with clear heads. 
Th ere is no question that Dr. Julie Tennille’s observation – “individuals 
with mental health conditions face additional obstacles to exploring 
their sexuality and forging satisfying intimate relationships”18 – must be 
“center stage” for this entire investigation. We must accept the reality that 
virtually all people are “sexual beings.”19
Th is paper will (1) briefl y review the history of how signifi cant legal 
and social issues regarding sexuality have been ignored and trivialized 
by legislators, policy makers, and the general public; (2) highlight those 
sections of the CRPD that force us to reconsider the scope of this issue; 
(3) off er some suggestions as to how ratifying and signatory states must 
change domestic policy so as to comport with CRPD mandates; and (4) 
consider the implications of therapeutic jurisprudence insights for the 
resolution of these issues.
Th e article title draws, in part, on Bob Dylan’s song Love Is Just a 
Four-Letter Word,20 a song that Dylan has never sung (although it remains 
17. Michael L Perlin, “Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual 
Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?” (1994) 20:3 NYU Rev L & 
Soc Change 517 at 537 [Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”]. For a 
subsequent consideration of the impact of this infantilization, see Janine 
Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of 
Women with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues” 
(2007) 52:3 McGill LJ 515.
18. Julie Tennille & Eric Wright, Addressing the Intimacy Interests of People 
with Mental Health Conditions: Acknowledging Consumer Desires, Provider 
Discomforts, and System Denial (2013) at 2 [unpublished monograph, 
archived at <http://tucollaborative.org/pdfs/Toolkits_Monographs_
Guidebooks/relationships_family_friends_intimacy/intimacy.pdf>].
19. McCann, “Breaking the Taboo”, supra note 12 at 134.
20. Bob Dylan, “Love is Just a Four-Letter Word”, online: Th e Offi  cial Bob 
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a frequent staple in Joan Baez’s repertoire).21 Th e standard “take” on the 
song is that it is “the bridge between his [Dylan’s] end-of-relationships 
blues and his giddy poetic streaks.”22 Yet, consider these lines in the 
context of the arguments we make in this paper:
 She sat with a baby heavy on her knee
 Yet spoke of life most free from slavery
and
 To you I had no words to say
 My experience was limited and underfed
 You were talking while I hid
and
 Drifting in and out of lifetimes
 Unmentionable by name.23
We believe that there is a deep “fi t” between these lyrics, the song’s 
title, and the points we seek to make in this paper. Persons with disabilities 
seeking sexual autonomy are in a kind of emotional and physiological 
“slavery”; their experiences are certainly “limited and underfed,” and 
what they wish for is seen, by so many, as “unmentionable by name.” Th e 
idea that persons with disabilities can love and be loved is a “four letter 
word” to many. We use this lyric here to stress the sadness of that reality.
Dylan Site <http://www.bobdylan.com/us/home>.
21. See e.g. Scott Johnson, “Love is Just a Four-Letter Word”, (blog), online: 
Power Line <http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2012/01/love-is-
just-a-four-letter-word.php>. One of the authors (MLP) last saw her sing 
it on 11 November 2011. See online: Joan Baez <http://www.joanbaez.
com/tourschedule11.html>.
22. Tim Riley, Hard Rain: A Dylan Commentary (New York: Random House, 
1992) at 109.
23. Dylan, supra note 20.
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II.  How Sexuality Issues Have Been Treated by Law  
 and Society
A.  In Psychiatric Institutions24
1.  An Overview
Before we can analytically approach the question of whether 
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities have the right to 
engage in consensual sexual activity, we must attempt some modest 
deconstruction. No doctrinal or theoretical formulation can be seriously 
undertaken until we articulate our perspective. Are we looking for a legal 
answer, a clinical answer, a social answer, an administrative answer, or 
a behavioural answer (or, as we should, a combination of all of these)? 
Surely we must consider each area of analysis separately, and in concert 
with each other, if we wish to construct a meaningful, multi-textured, 
and comprehensive response.
2.  What is Meant by “Sex”?
Twenty years ago, one of the authors (MLP) noted:
We must consider whether any of these answers depends upon our defi nition 
of sex. Do we need to consider every possible permutation of sexual behavior? 
Does it make a diff erence if we are discussing monogamous heterosexual sex, 
polygamous heterosexual sex, monogamous homosexual sex, polygamous 
homosexual sex, or bisexual sex? D oes sex mean intercourse? What about oral 
sex? A nal sex? Masturbation? Voyeurism? Exhibitionism?25
It probably makes sense, at the outset, to keep in mind that any 
consideration of the issues under discussion here must, at the least, 
24. Th is section is largely adapted from Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, 
supra note 17 at 522-28.
25. Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 at 527, citing in part to 
Michael L Commons et al, “Professionals’ Attitudes Towards Sex Between 
Institutionalized Patient” (1992) 46:4 American Journal of Psychotherapy 
571 (discussing ways that mental health professionals’ attitudes towards 
sex are infl uenced by the nature of the sexual activity and the patients’ 
sexual orientation). See e.g. Stevens, supra note 11 (“[i]n the limited 
amount of cases where sexual activity is permitted, it is generally only 
heterosexual marital sex that is allowed” at 16).
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take into account the realities that “sex” means much more than simply 
heterosexual intercourse. Although an exhaustive discussion of all 
permutations is not possible here, we will discuss briefl y the question 
of sexual-contact-other-than-“standard”-intercourse, the surprisingly 
nettlesome issue of masturbation, and the most controversial question of 
compensated sexual assistance.
i.  Other kinds of Sex
A recent article – about a civil law suit that followed litigation over a 
long-term relationship between a man with a psychosocial disability 
(schizophrenia) and a priest with AIDS – questions whether sex can be 
ordered like a “Guttman scale,”26 involving a “unidimensional behavioral 
hierarchy from French kissing to penetrative intercourse,”27 and 
wonders if “someone has consented to touching genitals over clothing 
… implies consent to French kissing,”28 asking whether “consent to one 
step automatically insure[s] consent to others below it?”29 Th is article 
does not begin to answer the preceding question, but the perspective 
of ordering is raised here to clarify that sex and sexual activities are not 
“unidimensional” questions, and that policymakers should be aware of 
the complexity of these issues. 
With non-normative sexual behaviour (including sexual activities 
engaged in with and without a partner) come other discriminatory beliefs 
by the majority of society that sub-cultures practicing such behaviours 
are “diff erent” and “abnormal.” While there are many variations of sexual 
behaviour, we will briefl y examine the issues surrounding masturbation 
26. In which items are arranged in an order so that an individual who agrees 
with a particular item also agrees with items of lower rank-order. See 
e.g. Judy A Andrews et al, “Th e Construction, Validation and Use of a 
 Guttman  Scale of Adolescent Substance Use: An Investigation of Family 
Relationships” (1991) 21:3 Journal of Drug Issues 557; Andreas Mokros 
et al, “Pychopathy and Sexual Sadism” (2011) 35:3 Law & Human 
Behavior 188 at 192.
27. Paul R Abramson, Terry Gross & Annaka Abramson, “Consenting to Sex 
and Severe Mental Illness: Terra Incognita and a Priest with AIDS” (2012) 
30:3 Sexuality and Disability 357 at 362.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
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and sexual surrogates, since some amount of research has been done in 
evaluating their impact on the community of persons with disabilities.
ii.  Masturbation30
Although at least one study has found that staff  workers at a medium-
security facility for persons with intellectual disabilities generally held 
“liberal attitudes” toward masturbation,31 and another article has called 
for “masturbation training,”32 much controversy swirls around the 
question of facilitated masturbation and the role of the caregiver in the 
facilitation process.33  It goes without saying that this is an issue that must 
30. On the roots of the 19th century view that masturbation was a cause of 
mental disorder, see EH Hare, “Masturbatory Insanity: Th e History of an 
Idea” (1962) 108 Journal of Mental Science 1.
31. Linda Yool et al, “Th e Attitudes of Medium-Secure Unit Staff  Toward the 
Sexuality of Adults with Learning Disabilities” (2003) 21:2 Sexuality and 
Disability 137. On the needs of staff  in dealing with sexuality issues, see 
generally Sharon Foley & Grace Kelly, Friendship and Taboos: Research 
on Sexual Health Promotion for People with Mild to Moderate Intellectual 
Disabilities in the 18-25 Age Range: Results of a Consultation Process and 
Literature Review (Cork: Health Service Executive South, 2009); see also 
Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, Consenting Adults? Guidance 
for Professionals when Considering Rights and Risks in Sexual Relationships 
Involving People with a Mental Disorder (Edinburgh: Mental Welfare 
Commission for Scotland, 2011).
32. Michael Gill, “Sex Can Wait, Masturbate: Th e Politics of Masturbation 
Training” (2012) 15:314 Sexualities 472; see generally Frederick Kaeser, 
“Developing a Philosophy of Masturbation Training for Persons with 
Severe or Profound Mental Retardation” (1996) 14:4 Sexuality and 
Disability 295. Virtually all of the literature focuses solely on issues of 
males masturbating as “the sexuality and sexual experiences of women 
with … disabilities have remained relatively hidden,” see Paul Cambridge, 
Steven Carnaby & Michelle McCarthy, “Responding to Masturbation in 
Supporting Sexuality and Challenging Behaviour in Services for People 
with Learning Disabilities” (2003) 7:3 Journal of Learning Disabilities 
251 at 253. See also, e.g. Dorothy M Bell & Lois Cameron, “Th e 
Assessment of the Sexual Knowledge of a Person with Severe Learning 
Disability and a Severe Communication Disorder” (2003) 31:3 British 
Journal of Learning Disabilities 123 at 128 (discussing a woman with 
limited verbal communication who “appeared to have no recognition of 
female masturbation”).
33. See e.g. Sara Earle, “Disability, Facilitated Sex, and the Role of the Nurse” 
(2001) 36:3 Journal of Advanced Nursing 433.
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be subject to discussion in an “open and value-free environment.”34
iii.  Care Workers
Perhaps the most controversial question – in a sea of controversial 
questions – is the appropriateness of using care workers as sexual 
surrogates in cases involving persons with disabilities. Such surrogacy 
can involve masturbation or intercourse.35 Several European nations 
– including Th e Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland – 
allow “limited ‘touching’ services for [persons with severe disabilities] 
through non-profi t organizations.”36 Elsewhere, there are organizations 
in Canada,37 Australia,38 Japan,39 and New Zealand,40 that, in the words of 
the Australian-based Touching Base website, “developed out of the need 
to assist people with disability and sex workers to connect with each other, 
focusing on access, discrimination, human rights and legal issues and the 
attitudinal barriers that these two marginalised communities can face.”41 
An administrative decision in Denmark has approved the payment of 
social welfare funding for an “escort girl” as a “handicap benefi t.”42 
It has been suggested by one medical ethicist that “jurisdictions that 
34. Clive Glass & Bakulesh Soni, “Sexual Problems of Disabled Patients” 
(1999) 318:7182 British Medical Journal 518. At least one academic 
consideration of the issue has noted that, concern within services often 
returns to the question of “whether such interventions, if successful, 
will then lead to the person spending too much time masturbating, as 
they may have learnt how to do it well and eff ectively,” see Cambridge, 
Carnaby & McCarthy, supra note 32 at 260. 
35. See online: Touching Base Inc <http://www.touchingbase.org/>.
36. Jacob Appel, “Sex Rights for the Disabled?” (2010) 36:3 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 152 at 153. 
37. See online: EASE Canada <http://easecanada.org/>. 
38. See Touching Base, supra note 35; online: Scarlet Road <http://www.
scarletroad.com.au>.
39. See online: White Hands <http://www.whitehands.jp/e.html>. 
40. See online: Paths Together <https://www.facebook.com/pages/
PathsTogether/552620 361438711>.
41. See Touching Base, supra note 35.
42. See email from Professor Kirsten Ketscher, WELMA – Centre for Legal 
Studies in Welfare and Market, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen 
(30 December 2013) (discussing the decision in Escort Girl C-106 
Danish Social Appeals Board).
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prohibit prostitution should carve out narrow exceptions for individuals 
whose physical or mental disabilities make sexual relationships with non-
compensated adults either impossible or highly unlikely.”43 Although 
there is at least one report of this having been done using Social Security 
funds in the USA,44 it is clearly an idea that has not gained signifi cant 
traction in that jurisdiction. In fact, any such use of sexual surrogacy has 
been sharply criticized as “distort[ing] sympathies for the situations of 
people with d isabilities to promote p rostitution.”45
Th is question, out of all those that arise when looking at sexual 
autonomy for persons with disabilities, is compounded by societal views 
about prostitution, exacerbated by the often-sanist thinking about the 
sexual needs of persons with disabilities.46 It is not surprising to see that 
nations that have legalized the profession of sex worker are more likely 
to have opportunities for sexual surrogacy.47 Th ese nations are allowing 
some of the stigma surrounding sex (and in particular, sex for people 
with disabilities) to be lifted, leading to a more honest discussion about 
meeting the basic needs of people, including the need for sex.
Sexual surrogacy also challenges society to imagine that a non-disabled 
person would be willing to engage in sexual activity with a disabled 
person. Entrenched sanism and long-standing fear of “contamination” or 
43. Appel, supra note 36 at 153. But see Ezio Di Nucci, “Sexual Rights and 
Disability” (2011) 37:3 Journal of Medical Ethics 158 (criticizing Appel’s 
position).
44. See David J Lillesand & Gina M Nguyen, SSI Trust and Transfer Rules, 
17 NAELA Q 3 (Spring 2004) (recounting case where a “sympathetic 
sister/trustee purchased ‘entertainment services,’ consisting of nursing 
home visits by  ‘escort services’ personnel to the nursing home where her 
severely disabled and dying brother resided”).
45. Dianne Post,  “Legalization of Prostitution Is a Violation of Human 
Rights” (2011) 68:2 National Lawyers Guild Review 65 at 92.
46. See generally Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?” supra note 17; Michael L 
Perlin, “‘Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain’: Considering 
the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of 
Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia” (2008) 83:4 Wash L 
Rev 481 [Perlin, “Everybody is Making Love”].
47. See e.g. Th e Legal Status of Prostitution by Country, online: Charts Bin 
<http://chartsbin.com/view/snb> (listing nations in which sex work is 
legal, overlapping in a large part with nations in which surrogates may be 
used, as discussed in supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text).
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disability as a “contagion” also make this concept a diffi  cult one to grasp 
for many who may be confronted with this form of sexuality.48 
Although surrogacy is not identical to engaging in an emotional 
relationship in which sex is a component, it is yet another option for 
people with disabilities to gain some autonomy in their decision making 
about their own needs. Under the CRPD, they have the same right to 
engage in sex that non-disabled people do,49 and surrogacy may aff ord 
an opportunity to those people who are, for many reasons, unable to or 
uninterested in engaging in a non-surrogate sexual relationship.
Th e diff erences between nations’ views on the “acceptability” of 
masturbation and sexual surrogacy are also indicative of those nations’ 
dominant norms and values. Professor Elaine Craig has discussed the 
danger of regulating activity based on the dominant norms of a society, 
stating that if legal standards are applied based only on dominant 
belief systems, they “[privilege] dominant social, cultural and religious 
practices.”50 Further, in the context of consent laws, she notes that “[s]ocial 
approval is not an equitable basis upon which to criminalize particular 
sexual activities.”51 Although the disability rights movement has made 
great strides, persons with disabilities continue to remain a minority 
group, rather than a part of the dominant culture in most nations.52 Th eir 
48. See e.g. Judith S Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil: Th e Origins of Madness 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1975) at 31, 144 (addressing the 
stereotype of persons with mental illness as evil), cited in Michael L 
Perlin, “‘She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl’: Neonaticide, Th e Insanity 
Defense, and the Irrelevance of Ordinary Common Sense” (2003) 10:1 
Wm & Mary J Women & L 1 at 9, n 54 [Perlin, “Neonaticide”].
49. See CRPD, supra note 7, Article 23 (discussed in this context, see text 
accompanying note 103).
50. Elaine Craig, “Capacity to Consent to Sexual Risk” (2014) 17:1 New 
Criminal Law Review 103 at 117.
51. Ibid. 
52. Interestingly, much of the literature about the CRPD has focused upon 
persons with disabilities as the “world’s largest minority,” see e.g. Rosemary 
Kayess & Phillip French, “Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2008) 8:1 
Human Rights Law Review 1 at 4, n 16, discussed in this context in, inter 
alia, Michael L Perlin, “‘Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the 
Mind’: Th e Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities 
and the Future of Guardianship Law” (2013) 117:4 Penn St L Rev 1159 
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rights and needs may not be legislated away by that dominant culture 
because majority populations believe sexual activities of persons with 
disabilities do not produce “socially desirable cultural products.”53
B.  Current Laws Relating to Sexual Autonomy of   
 Persons with Disabilities
As noted previously, discussion of sexual autonomy relating to persons 
with disabilities are few and far between in scholarly journals. In the 
United States, the law has followed this trend, with very little attention 
paid to the legal rights of persons with disabilities to exercise their 
autonomy, especially in an institutional setting. Many critical questions 
remain unanswered in the law, leaving hospitals and community treatment 
facilities to decide for themselves how to best deal with these issues. 
Often, these decisions are made with no clear guidelines and carried out 
on a case-by-case basis. Remarkably, none of the respondents questioned 
in a British study were even aware that they had any “sexual rights.”54 And 
we virtually never consider the argument posited by the medical ethicist 
Jacob Appel in this context that sexual pleasure is a fundamental human 
right.55
Th e United States Supreme Court, federal district courts, and 
state courts have all addressed the range of constitutional rights held 
by involuntarily committed individuals, such as the right to counsel,56 
at 1173, n 62 [Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians”].
53. Craig, supra note 50 at 117.
54. McCann, “Breaking the Taboo”, supra note 12 at 136.
55. Appel, supra note 36 at 154. See also Stevens, supra note 11 
(“[p]oliticizing sexual pleasure and oppression of disabled people through 
enacting cripsex is a powerful way to affi  rm our humanity,” where author 
defi nes “cripsex” to “express the political nature of the sexuality of disabled 
people” at 16). Compare Di Nucci, supra note 43 at 160 (responding to 
Appel, and disagreeing with this thesis, in large part, because, if Appel’s 
theory was to be adopted, “we would end up with a situation in which 
severely disabled people have their sexual satisfaction paid for them by 
the state, while everybody else will have to pay for it, or go through the 
trouble of fi nding willing non-compensated sexual partners”).
56. In the matter of the Mental Health of KGF, 29 P (3d) 485 at 491 (Mont 
Sup Ct 2001).
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the right to refuse medication,57 and the right to be treated in the least 
restrictive environment,58 to name but a few.59 Th e number of cases 
litigated by persons with disabilities has grown exponentially since the 
1970s.60 However, the right to sexual autonomy has remained an elusive 
topic, with very few references to it in any major state or federal court 
decision involving persons with disabilities.61
Legislation has also failed to adequately address issues of sexual 
autonomy both in and out of mental health facilities. A case may be 
made for regulations or laws allowing sexual activity in certain settings 
based on domestic disability anti-discrimination laws. If sexual activity is 
banned for no other reason than the “disabled” status of the consenting 
adults wishing to engage in such activity, it may be argued that this sort 
of per se discrimination violates the Americans with Disabilities Act or 
other similar pieces of legislation.62
C.  Th e Eff ects of Institutionalization on Persons with  
 Disabilities and Sexual Autonomy 
Next, we must consider the practical implications of sexual relationships 
in a closed institution like a psychiatric hospital.63 Under the best of 
57. Riggins v Nevada, 504 US 127 (1992).
58. Olmstead v LC, 527 US 581 (1999).
59. Th e broad range of topics also includes competency evaluations for 
mentally ill criminal defendants (Dusky v United States, 362 US 402 
(1960); Drope v Missouri, 420 US 162 (1975); Pate v Robinson, 383 
US 375 (1966)); illegality of indefi nite confi nement of persons found 
incompetent to stand trial (Jackson v Indiana, 406 US 715 (1972)); 
prisoners’ rights (Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97 (1976); Washington v 
Harper, 494 US 210 (1990)); the civil commitment process (Addington 
v Texas, 441 US 418 (1979)); and rights of civilly committed patients 
(Youngberg v Romeo, 457 US 307 (1982); O’Connor v Donaldson, 422 US 
563 (1975)).
60. See Michael L Perlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal, 2d ed, 
vol 1 (Charlottesville, VA: Lexis Law Publishing, 1998) at § 1-1, 1 [Perlin, 
Mental Disability Law] (discussing the “astonishing development of 
mental disability litigation” over past decades).
61. But see Foy v Greenblott, 190 Cal Rptr 84 (Ct App 1983) discussed below 
and notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
62. See generally Perlin, “Promises by the Hour”, supra note 12.
63. On the issues of sexual autonomy in forensic facilities in general, see 
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circumstances, entering into a new sexual relationship can be stressful 
and confusing. Are these stresses “inappropriately” exacerbated when the 
universe in question is that of institutionalized mental patients? To what 
extent should the diff ering stress management abilities of institutionalized 
individuals be factored into any policy ultimately adopted? Conversely, 
can preoccupation with sex systemically distort all matters involving 
ward behaviour? How does this focus aff ect questions of individual versus 
group needs? Might an excessive concern with sex blunt the consideration 
of other related issues, such as self-esteem, the importance of developing 
a full range of interpersonal relationships, and the ability to deal with 
intimacy? We impose signifi cant barriers that prevent institutionalized 
persons with mental disabilities from establishing intimacy.64 Yet, one 
study showed that most patients in high-security hospitals “valu[ed] being 
in a caring relationship [while] in the hospital,”65 and that there was likely 
“an ongoing desire for intimacy regardless of gender, diagnosis or off ense 
group.”66
A closed institution, by its nature, places substantial limits on 
individuals’ mobility and freedom of action. In considering how best to 
allow individuals to express their autonomy, it is important to consider 
all aspects of a relationship, including issues indirectly raised by sexual 
intimacy. For example, when people in the “free world” terminate a 
Perlin, “Everybody is Making Love”, supra note 46. On the relationship 
between the CRPD and forensic facilities in general, see Michael L Perlin 
& Meredith R Schriver, “‘You Th at Hide Behind Walls’: Th e Relationship 
between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
the Convention Against Torture and the Treatment of Institutionalized 
Forensic Patients” in Torture in Healthcare Settings: Refl ections on the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture’s 2013 Th ematic Report (American University: 
Center for Human Rights & Humanitarian Law, 2013) at 195; Michael 
L Perlin & Alison J Lynch, “‘Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of 
Despair’: Risk, Security, Danger, the Constitution, and the Clinician’s 
Dilemma” (2015) 26 Stan L & Pol’y Rev – [in press].
64. On the “false assumptions” made by many care providers about the 
“fundamental importance of intimacy to consumer well-being,” see 
Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 at 9.
65. See Heidi Hales et al, “Sexual Attitudes, Experience and Relationships 
Amongst Patients in a High Security Hospital” (2006) 16:4 Criminal 
Behaviour and Mental Health 254 at 260.
66. Ibid.
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stormy love aff air, frequently they can adjust their lives so as not to have 
much contact with their former lovers. What happens if that ex-lover lives 
on the same fl oor of an inpatient hospital (especially if it is a locked ward 
hospital), and neither patient can leave without a court order? Conversely, 
what happens when a couple is split up by a court order transferring one 
patient to another ward or facility for clinical or legal reasons?67 Th ese are 
decisions that must be considered in order to allow individuals confi ned 
in an institution the ability to engage in a relationship just as they would 
in the “free world.” Although an institution may need to restrict some 
privileges based on safety or treatment concerns, it will be critical for 
institutions to consider a “least restrictive environment” approach when 
dealing with patients’ sexual autonomy, as it is undoubtedly part of their 
rights under the CRPD. 
Another series of issues to consider comes from diff erences in the 
status of institutionalized persons.68 Th ose institutionalized after being 
civilly committed, ordered confi ned for a competency evaluation, or 
held in a locked facility after a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity 
each have rights and aspects of law that are unique to each particular 
status.  Assuming the individuals wishing to engage in sexual activity are 
competent to consent,69 are all patients to be treated in the same way, or 
are there diff erences between voluntarily and involuntarily committed 
67. Th is is made more complicated by decisions such as Kulak v City of 
New York, 88 F (3d) 63 at 73 (2d Cir 1996) (no liberty interest created 
by court recommendation that mental hospital transfer involuntarily-
committed patient to less restrictive environment because transfer was not 
mandatory).
68. See e.g. Michael L Perlin, “‘Too Stubborn To Ever Be Governed By 
Enforced Insanity’: Some Th erapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the 
Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity 
Cases” (2010) 33:5-6 Int’l J L & Psychiatry 475 at 480 (discussing 
signifi cance of patients’ “litigational status” on questions involving right 
to refuse treatment).
69. Th e topic of competency to consent to sexual activities in a psychiatric 
institution is an extremely complex topic that should be addressed 
separately, in great depth.  See generally Michael L Perlin & Alison J 
Lynch, “‘All His Sexless Patients’: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the 
Competence to Have Sex” (2014) 89:2 Wash L Rev 257 [Perlin, “All His 
Sexless Patients”].  For the purposes of this paper, the authors choose to 
assume the individuals discussed are legally competent to consent. 
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patients that are relevant to this inquiry? Further, should involuntary 
commitment implicitly restrict one’s freedom to engage in sexual activity? 
Is it justifi able, or even legally required, to place diff erent restrictions 
on patients who have been committed following their involvement in 
the criminal justice system, in comparison to those imposed on civilly 
committed patients?  If competency to consent is not at issue, disallowing 
sexual activity solely based on legal status appears punitive, rather than 
therapeutic. 
Ultimately, the lingering question when considering sexual autonomy 
of institutionalized persons is, in any event, can patients be stopped from 
having sex?
D.  Clinical Questions Regarding Sexual Autonomy of  
 Persons with Disabilities 
Next, we must consider clinical questions. A patient’s treatment team is 
charged with fi nding the most therapeutic treatment in the least restrictive 
environment. For many patients, this involves therapy intended to help 
them transition back to living in the “real world.” Th at can include 
behavioural therapy and group programs that encourage social interaction. 
Questions of sexual autonomy should also be considered within that 
context in developing and assessing a treatment plan and long-term 
goals for a patient both in and out of a treatment facility. For example, 
clinicians should note whether the patient in question ever expressed any 
wish to engage in sexual activity, and then discuss whether it is clinically 
benefi cial or anti-therapeutic to allow institutionalized patients autonomy 
in sexual decision-making.70 In answering this question, to what extent 
should clinicians consider research on the therapeutic value of touching 
and physical intimacy?71 Should the projected length of a patient’s 
70. On how interpersonal relationships among patients can help further 
treatment goals, see Edmund G Doherty, “Social Attraction and Choice 
Among Psychiatric Patients and Staff : A Review” (1971) 12:4 Journal 
of Health & Social Behavior 279 at 287. See also Stevens, supra note 
11 (“[r]ecognition and expression of sexual autonomy has many health 
benefi ts, including analgesic eff ects, hypertension reduction, and increased 
relaxation” at 23).
71. See McCann, “Breaking the Taboo”, supra note 12 (quoting patient, 
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hospitalization aff ect the restrictions placed on their sexual autonomy? If 
so, how? 72 What is the impact of sexual activity on diff erent methods of 
treatment? On the overall ward milieu? What correlative responsibilities 
come with the assertion of rights? 73 
Th ese questions also lead to a consideration of patient sexual 
autonomy from the perspective of hospital offi  cials, and the reasons 
for their discomfort with the subject. Why are hospital administrators 
resistant to expanded sexual activity on the part of patients? Is it more 
than simple inconvenience, or even the fear of unwanted pregnancies? 
How much does a fear of a potential hospital-wide AIDS epidemic 
contribute to this resistance?74 How realistic and genuine is this fear? 
Th e expansion of provider liability is the source of realistic concerns on 
the part of therapists that an ever-expanding range of clinical decisions 
may lead to ever-expanding personal liability.75 One commentator has 
suggested that the threat of litigation has led hospital administrators to 
responding to survey question on the meaning of intimacy: “[s]ex, 
love, caring, and sharing … things like that” [emphasis added] at 136). 
Th ere has been academic literature available about this for over 40 years, 
though it is rarely cited in the legal literature. See e.g. Ashley Montagu, 
Touching: Th e Human Signifi cance of Skin, 2d ed (USA: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1971); Harry F Harlow, Margaret K Harlow & Stephen J 
Suomi, “From Th ought to Th erapy” (1971) 59:5 American Scientist 
538. Professor Heather Ellis Cucolo has focused on this in her recent 
work on sex off enders. She asks why we fail to acknowledge that the 
concept of intimacy is “the key to preventing and minimizing re-off ense.” 
See Heather Ellis Cucolo, “Right to Sex in the Treatment and Civil 
Commitment of Sexual Violent Predators” (2007) [unpublished, on 
fi le with authors]. Th is is a reality that must be considered as we further 
explore this issue. 
72. See generally Douglas J Mossman, Michael L Perlin & Deborah A 
Dorfman, “Sex on the Wards: Conundra for Clinicians” (1997) 25:4 
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 441.
73. Mossman, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 72.
74. On the fear of an AIDS epidemic in the context of disability rights issues, 
see Samuel R Bagenstos, “Th e Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk 
Regulation” (2001) 101:6 Colum L Rev 1479 at 1492.
75. See e.g. Allison Faber Walsh, “Th e Legal Attack on Cost Containment 
Mechanisms: Th e Expansion of Liability for Physicians and Managed 
Care Organizations” (1997) 31:1 J Marshall L Rev 207; Robert John 
Kane, “Illinois Legal Developments Aff ecting Physicians and Hospitals” 
(2010) 31:1 J Legal Med 73.
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“attempt to minimize the complexity of patient sexuality by focusing 
on the symbolic, simplistic reassurance of written procedures.”76 Was 
this response idiosyncratic to the circumstances at a particular hospital, 
or is this practice more common? Professor Bernadette McSherry and 
Professor Margaret Somerville note on this point: 
[E]ven if a written policy on sexual activity is put in place, the fear of litigation 
by institution administrators may still lead to the “policing” of such activity 
in case some form of harm may be taking place. Th e threat of litigation may 
therefore lead to staff  members erring on the side of caution in relation to 
sexual activity among those in institutions.77
E.  Cultural Issues Surrounding Sexual Autonomy of   
 Institutionalized Patients
Th e nature of this topic makes it, inevitably, a contentious point among 
the various groups that will debate it, legislate it, and implement it. 
Beliefs and values beyond law and legislation are intertwined with 
attitudes toward sexual activity. Culture, politics, religion, and senses of 
“morality” are all elements that must be addressed in order to realistically 
work through these diffi  cult issues and come to a consensus on the 
proper way to address them. Even if policies are promulgated to protect 
and respect the sexual autonomy of institutionalized individuals, what 
happens when individual line staff  at a hospital, the people to whom the 
implementation of the policy inevitably falls, simply refuse to cooperate 
with the policy because their own sense of religious “morality” forbids 
it?78 For example, their religion may teach that unmarried persons – of 
76. Terry Holbrook, “Policing Sexuality in a Modern State Hospital” (1989) 
40:1 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 75 at 79 (discussing the results 
of a psychiatric hospital’s failure to notify the police of the sexual assault 
of one patient by another).
77. Bernadette McSherry & Margaret A Somerville, “Sexual Activity Among 
Institutionalized Persons in Need of Special Care” (1998) 16 Windsor YB 
Access Just 90 at 124. On how the avoidance of  anticipated prospective 
harm has become central to much of disability law policy in this area, 
see generally Dimopoulos, supra note 1 (Dimopoulos argues that, “[b]y 
seeking to avoid harm to self we are perpetuating oppressive social and 
legal responses which presented persons with disabilities as asexual, or 
worse still, as individuals who should be asexual” at 8).  
78. In general, on the signifi cance of care provider discomfort around sexual 
30 
 
Perlin & Lynch, Love Is Just A Four-Letter Word
any mental capacity – should not have sex, or that married persons – of 
any mental capacity – should not have extramarital sex. Is it justifi able 
for private facilities that are church-affi  liated, or private nonsectarian 
facilities that retain units specially designated for practitioners of specifi c 
religions, to apply diff erent restrictions in these areas?79  
F.  Conclusion
Th e issues discussed above should underscore the point that this topic 
is complex and under-considered in the literature and laws regarding 
persons with disabilities. 80 Th ese complexities are compounded by society’s 
generally irrational attitudes towards persons with mental disabilities.81 
Th e lack of attention, litigation, and commentary on this subject appears 
anomalous. Institutionalized persons self-evidently do not lose their 
sexuality or sexual desires when they lose their liberty. Th ere is some 
added irony to be found in the fact that litigation over antipsychotic 
medication refusal – the most contentious aspect of institutionalized 
patients’ rights law – centers on drug side eff ects, and the loss of sexual 
desire is one of the most highly-noted amongst them.82 Th us, the law 
expression by persons with mental disabilities, see Tennille & Wright, 
supra note 18 at 8-9.
79. Ibid (“[f ]aith-based provider services … often care for consumers who 
do not share the same religious traditions or spiritual beliefs about 
expressions of sexuality” at 11).
80. Suzanne Doyle, “Th e Notion of Consent to Sexual Activity for Persons 
with Mental Disabilities” (2010) 31:2 Liverpool Law Review 111.  
81. See Tom Koch, “Th e Ideology of Normalcy: Th e Ethics of Diff erence” 
(2005) 16:2 Journal of Disability Policy Studies 123 at 125 (individuals 
with disabilities are thought to be “diff erent” by society. Th e ideology 
of normalcy, which applies to issues facing individual with disabilities, 
is based on the idea that “persons of diff erence necessarily possess a 
diminished level of personhood” which extends to every aspect of their 
daily lives).
82. Th e loss of sexual desire as a side eff ect to be considered in determining 
the scope of patients’ right to refuse treatment is weighed in, inter 
alia, In re Orr, 531 N E (2d) 64 at 74 (Ill App Ct 1988); In re Roe, 
421 N E (2d) 40 at 54 (Mass Sup Ct 1981); Jarvis v Levine, 418 N W 
(2d) 139 at 145-46 (Minn Sup Ct 1988). See also Tennille & Wright, 
supra note 18 (“[b]eyond having diffi  culty merely meeting someone 
interesting with whom to become sexually intimate, an important part 
of the story for many consumers is the frustrating sexual dysfunction 
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acknowledges that sexual desire of a person in need of medication is 
a suffi  ciently important personal trait so that its diminution must be 
weighed into the formulation of a medication refusal policy. Yet the law 
simultaneously denies patients the power and importance of sexual desire 
with respect to hospital ward life.83
Most states do not recognize a patient’s right to personal or 
interpersonal sexual relationships. In practice, a patient’s right to sexual 
interaction often depends on the whim of line-level staff  or on whether 
such interaction is seen as a feature of the patient’s treatment plan. It has 
even been suggested that “sexual activity between psychiatric inpatients 
should be strictly prohibited and when it occurs patients should be 
isolated … and tranquilized if necessary.” 84 One hospital’s guidelines 
counsel patients as follows: “[i]f you develop a relationship with another 
patient, staff  will get together with you to help decide whether this 
relationship is benefi cial or detrimental to you.”85 Hospital staff  are often 
hostile to the idea that patients may be sexually active in any way.86
However, many institutional mental health professionals and 
that occurs from adhering to prescribed psychotropic medication regimes” 
at 6-7); Peter Bartlett, “‘Th e Necessity Must Be Convincingly Shown 
to Exist’: Standards for Compulsory Treatment for Mental Disorder 
under the Mental Health Act 1983” (2011) 19:4 Med L Rev 514 
(antipsychotic medications “cause impotence or other sexual dysfunction 
in approximately 45% of individuals” at 518); McCann, “Breaking the 
Taboo”, supra note 12 at 133 (discussing how full range of antipsychotic 
medication side-eff ects “may greatly aff ect the potential to form 
relationships”).
83. On the ways that the stigma of mental illness increases isolation, and its 
impact on sexual behaviour and autonomy, see Eric Wright et al, “Stigma 
and the Sexual Isolation of People with Serious Mental Illness” (2007) 
54:1 Social Problems 78.  On how neglecting consumer sexuality issues 
reinforces stigma, see Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 at 13.
84. Renee Binder, “Sex Between Psychiatric Inpatients” (1985) 57:2 
Psychiatric Quarterly 121 at 125.
85. Gabor Keitner & Paul Grof, “Sexual and Emotional Intimacy Between 
Psychiatric Inpatients: Formulating a Policy” (1981) 32:3 Hospital & 
Community Psychiatry 188 at 193. See also Tennille and Wright, supra 
note 18 at 9 (discussing false belief of care providers that “[i]t is the 
providers’ role to protect consumers from romantic rejection”). 
86. See e.g. Rogers v Okin, 478 F Supp 1342 at 1373-74 (Mass D 1979) 
(noting that patients are secluded for engaging in sexual behaviour).
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behaviourists now recognize that patients “are and wish to be sexually 
active,” 87 and that sexual freedom often has therapeutic value.88 Writing 
about this recently, Andreas Dimopoulos has argued forcefully that, “[b]y 
seeking to avoid harm to self we are perpetuating oppressive social and 
legal responses which presented persons with disabilities as asexual, or 
worse still, as individuals who should be asexual.”89 
Others call attention to our societal obligation to provide family 
planning assistance to women institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals. 90 
Nonetheless, many hospitals remain reluctant to promulgate such 
policies. Th is is not surprising, given the aforementioned paucity of legal 
authority requiring them to do so. Moreover, there is a near complete 
lack of literature generally available to guide hospitals and their staff , 
should they even desire to formulate such procedures. 
Th ere is little case law on the questions addressed in this paper.  Of 
the few litigated cases, the most important is  Foy  v  Greenblott. 91 Th ere, an 
institutionalized patient and her infant child (conceived and born while 
87. Steven Welch et al, “Sexual Behavior of Hospitalized Chronic Psychiatric 
Patients” (1991) 42:8 Hospital & Community Psychiatry 855 at 855.
88. Binder, supra note 84 at 122.
89. Dimopoulos, supra note 1 at 8.
90. See e.g. Virginia Abernethy et al, “Family Planning During Psychiatric 
Hospitalization” (1976) 46:1 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 
154. On the ways that coercive family planning is sometimes imposed 
in facilities in China, see Sean D Murphy, “Criticism of PRC’s Human 
Rights Practices” (2000) 94:3 Am J Int’l L 526 at 527. On the question of 
forced contraception, see Carolyn Frohmader & Stephanie Ortoleva, “Th e 
Sexual and Reproductive Rights of Women and Girls with Disabilities” 
(Paper prepared for the ICPD Human Rights Conference on Sexual 
and Reproductive Health, sponsored by OHCHR, UNFPA, and the 
Government of the Netherlands, 1 July 2013), online: Women Enabled 
<http://womenenabled.org/publications.html> (“[f ]orced contraception, 
recognised as a form of torture, is commonly used on women and girls 
with disabilities to suppress menstruation or sexual expression for various 
purposes, including eugenics-based practices of population control, 
menstrual management and personal care, and pregnancy prevention 
(including pregnancy that results from sexual abuse)” at 5). On the 
relationship of feminist legal theory to disability theory, see Doyle, supra 
note 80.
91. 190 Cal Rptr 84 (Ct App 1983) [Foy]. See generally Perlin, “Make 
Promises by the Hour”, supra note 12 at 966-67.
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the mother was a patient in a locked psychiatric ward) sued the mother’s 
treating doctor for his failure to either maintain proper supervision 
over her so as to prevent her from having sex or to provide her with 
contraceptive devices and/or sexual counseling.92  
 Th e Court rejected the plaintiff ’s claims of improper supervision, 
fi nding that institutionalized patients had a right to engage in voluntary 
sexual relations as an aspect of either the “least restrictive environment” 
or “reasonably non-restrictive confi nement conditions” and that that 
right (to less or reasonably non-restrictive confi nement) included 
suitable opportunities for the patient’s interactions with members of 
the opposite sex.93  On the other hand, the Court did characterize the 
defendant’s failure to provide the plaintiff  with contraceptive devices and 
counseling as a deprivation of her right to reproductive choice.94  It also 
rejected a claim for “wrongful birth” by the infant child, concluding that 
“[o]ur society has repudiated the proposition that  mental patients will 
necessarily beget unhealthy, inferior or otherwise undesirable children if 
permitted to reproduce.” 95
 While Foy has been applauded as “a model exposition of the 
reproductive rights of institutionalized women,”96  it is an isolated case. 
A reading of the case law reveals that this area simply does not exist as an 
active area of patients’ rights litigation.97
92. Foy, ibid at 87.
93. Ibid at 90, n 2.
94. Ibid at 91-92.
95. Ibid at 93.
96. Susan Stefan, “Whose Egg is it Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of 
Incarcerated, Institutionalized and Incompetent Women” (1989) 13:2 
Nova L Rev 405 at 433.
97. See Perlin, Mental Disability Law, supra note 60 at § 3C-5.1, 416-21 
(reviewing developments). See also Dimopoulos, supra note 1, discussing 
– and sharply criticizing – recent British cases of  A Local Authority v H 
[2012] EWHC 49 (COP), and D Borough Council v AB [2011] EWHC 
101 (COP), both of which concluded that individuals with intellectual 
disabilities did not have the capacity to consent to sexual interaction. A 
recent case in Israel has found that a person with schizophrenia has a right 
to family, and that sperm retrieval for this purpose is allowed. See Ploni v 
Israel Legal Attorney, Case # 6036-10-08 (Haifa Family Ct, 29 Dec 2013) 
(decision, in Hebrew, and explanatory email from Dr. Maya Sabatello, on 
fi le with authors).
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At the same time, there is little in the way of legislation. By way of 
example, although many American jurisdictions have enacted “patients’ 
bills of rights” providing a broad array of civil rights and liberties for 
persons institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals, only a few jurisdictions 
mandate a limited right to sexual interaction.98 
In general, the lack of statutory authority and case law logically leads 
to the next question: since we are, by all accounts, a fairly litigious group 
of people, why not? Why hasn’t this area – one that deals with the most 
personal of rights99 – been the subject of greater scrutiny or of court 
decrees (or even of substantial scholarly writings)?100 Although there has 
98. See e.g. Ohio Rev Code, § 5122.29(I) (“[t]he right to social interaction 
with members of either sex, subject to adequate supervision, unless 
such social interaction is specifi cally withheld under a patient’s written 
treatment plan for clear treatment reasons.”); Mont Code Ann, § 53-
21-142(10) (“[p]atients have the right to be provided, with adequate 
supervision, suitable opportunities for interaction with members of the 
opposite sex except to the extent that a professional person in charge of 
the patient’s treatment plan writes an order stating that the interaction is 
inappropriate to the treatment regimen.”); NJ Stat Ann, § 30:4-24.2(10) 
(“[[p]atients have the right to] suitable opportunities for interaction with 
members of the opposite sex, with adequate supervision”). 
99. Th is is especially ironic in that we acknowledge the signifi cance of sexual 
autonomy in other related areas of law, but ignore it here, see Perlin, 
“Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 (“the law acknowledges 
that sexual desire is a suffi  ciently important personal trait so that its 
diminution must be weighed into the formulation of a medication refusal 
policy. Yet the law simultaneously denies the power and importance of 
sexual desire with respect to hospital ward life” at 531).
100. Th ere are remarkably few modern law review articles on the global issue 
of mental patient sexuality published in the US. See e.g. Winiviere Sy, 
“Th e Right of Institutionalized Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual  
Sexual Activity” (2001) 23:2 Whittier Law Review 545; and Evelyn 
M Tenenbaum, “To Be or to Exist: Standards for Deciding Whether 
Dementia Patients in Nursing Homes Should Engage in Intimacy, Sex, 
and Adultery” (2009) 42:3 Ind L Rev 675. See also, discussing Professor 
Tenenbaum’s work, J Richard Lindsay, “Th e Need for More Specifi c 
Legislation in Sexual Consent Capacity Assessments for Nursing Home 
Residents” (2010) 31:3 J Legal Med 303 at 306. For a transnational 
perspective, see Hella von Unger, “Th e Meaning and Management of 
Women’s Sexuality in Psychiatric vs. Community Psychiatric Settings in 
Berlin, Germany” (Paper delivered at the Th irtieth International Congress 
on Law and Mental Health, in Padua, Italy, 26 June 2007), [unpublished, 
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been attention paid to this issue in nursing and psychiatric literature, 101 
there has been virtually no “carryover” to the question of the legal 
implications of the policies for clinicians (or lack of policies).102 And, of 
course, our attitudes exhibit willful blindness to the reality that patients 
are – and likely always have been – sexually active.103  
We also need to consider how we set priorities in defi ning the 
underlying question of how we, as a society, can restructure our laws 
regarding the autonomy of individuals with disabilities to engage in 
sexual activities of their choice. What do we look at fi rst: autonomy rights, 
civil libertarian concerns, due process requirements, privacy interests, 
competency criteria, clinical needs, therapeutic jurisprudential concerns, 
tort liability worries, voluntariness constructs, or the immutable fact that 
sexual interaction, by its very description, entails the participation of 
more than one individual? No resolution of the underlying issues can 
be contemplated unless we distinguish these approaches and carefully 
powerpoint on fi le with author], cited in Perlin, “Everybody is Making 
Love”, supra note 46 at 489, n 33. 
101. See e.g. Diane J Torkelson & May T Dobal, “Sexual Rights of Persons 
with Serious and Persistent Mental Illness: Gathering Evidence for 
Decision Making” (1999) 5:5 Journal of the American Psychiatric 
Nurses Association 150; May T Dobal & Diane J Torkelson, “Making 
Decisions about Sexual Rights in Psychiatric Facilities” (2004) 18:2 
Archives of Psychiatric Nursing 68; Eddie McCann, “Exploring Sexual 
and Relationship Possibilities for People with Psychosis – A Review of the 
Literature” (2003) 10:6 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 
640; Ronald WD Stevenson, “Sexual Medicine: Why Psychiatrists Must 
Talk to Th eir Patients about Sex” (2004) 49:10 Canadian Journal of 
Psychiatry 673.
102. See Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 (“many hospitals 
remain reluctant to promulgate such policies” at 532); but compare Dobal 
& Torkelson, supra note 101 at 68 (60% of psychiatric facilities polled 
reported having such policies).
103. Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 at 532; Welch et al, 
supra note 87 at 855. See Susan Stefan, “Joshua’s Children: Constitutional 
Responsibility for Institutionalized Persons after Deshaney v. Winnebago 
County” (2013) 70:1 Wash & Lee L Rev 793 (“[s]exual activity in 
institutional settings is more common than outsiders might imagine, 
and runs that gamut from mutual and supportive relationships between 
patients through exploitation, coercion, and rape by other patients and 
staff ” at 800).
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articulate their interrelationships, their potential confl icts, and their 
relative values as competing social choices. In short, this is a very diffi  cult 
project.
III. Other Approaches
A.  International Human Rights
Scholars have begun in recent years to focus more carefully and 
thoughtfully on the relationship between mental disability law and 
international human rights law.104 In our own writing, we have explored 
this connection in the context of forensic facility conditions, correctional 
law, appointment of counsel, psychological evaluations in criminal cases, 
and how the law shames and humiliates persons with mental disabilities.105 
104. See e.g. Aaron Dhir, “Human Rights Treaty Drafting Th rough the Lens of 
Mental Disability: the Proposed International Convention on Protection 
and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities” 
(2005) 41:2 Stan J Int’l L 181; Paul Harpur, “Time to Be Heard: How 
Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities to Drive Change” (2011) 45:3 Val U L Rev 1271; Bryan Y 
Lee, “Th e U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals 
with Developmental Disabilities” (2011) 44:3 Colum JL & Soc Probs 
393;  István Hoff man & György Könczei, “Le gal Regulations Relating 
to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and 
Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian 
Civil Code” (2010) 33:1 Loy LA Int’l & Comp L Rev 143.
105. See e.g. Perlin, International Human Rights, supra note 7; Perlin & 
Schriver, supra note 63; Michael L Perlin, “‘A Change Is Gonna Come’: 
Th e Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional 
Mental Disability Law” (2009) 29:3 N Ill UL Rev 483; Michael L 
Perlin & Valerie R McClain, “‘Where Souls Are Forgotten’: Cultural 
Competencies, Forensic Evaluations and International Human Rights” 
(2009) 15:4 Psychol Pub Pol’y & L 257; Astrid Birgden & Michael 
L Perlin, “‘Tolling for the Luckless, the Abandoned and Forsaked’: 
Th erapeutic Jurisprudence and International Human Rights Law As 
Applied to Prisoners and Detainees by Forensic Psychologists” (2008) 
13:2 Legal & Criminological Psychology 231; Michael L Perlin, “‘I 
Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial’: Global 
Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment 
Cases” (2008) 28 Wash UJL & Pol’y 241; Perlin & Lynch, supra note 
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We believe that the ratifi cation of the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities demands that society and legislators alike 
reconsider this entire issue. First, the CRPD mandates nations to 
“[p]rovide persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and 
standard of free or aff ordable health care and programmes as provided 
to other persons, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health 
and population-based public health programmes.”106 Beyond that, the 
other Convention Articles referred to above speak to dignity, the absence 
of discrimination, and the provision of sexual/reproductive health 
services.107 Th e Convention goes further than most legislation and court 
decisions, directly addressing not only the freedom to engage in sex, but 
outcomes of sexual activity, by codifying the disabled person’s right to form 
a family, right to information and services for sexual health, and notably, 
the right to “retain their fertility on an equal basis with others.”108 Yet, 
even given the specifi c and detailed language of the CRPD, the literature 
has been remarkably silent on these issues in general, especially as they 
relate to the CRPD’s impact on the rights of persons institutionalized 
due to psychosocial or intellectual disability, to sexual autonomy.109  Th is 
63; Michael L Perlin & Naomi Weinstein, “‘Friend to the Martyr, a 
Friend to the Woman of Shame’: Th inking About Th e Law, Shame and 
Humiliation” (2014) Southern California Review of Law and Social 
Justice [in press].
106. CRPD, supra note 7, Article 25.
107. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
108. CRPD, supra note 7, Article 23.
109. Th ere has been only sporadic attention paid to sexuality issues in 
the country reports issued by the UN Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities; see Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, online: United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights <http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/crpd/pages/crpdindex.aspx>; 
Committee on the Rights of persons with Disabilities, Implementation of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, OHCHR, 10th 
Sess, CRPD/C/AUS/1, (2012) (Australia, the sole mention of sexuality 
issues: “[t]he WA Department of Health funds the Sexuality Education 
Counselling and Consulting Service, which develops and implements 
health promotion programs to enhance the health and wellbeing of 
persons with disabilities and educate the wider community in areas of 
sexuality and disability” at 33, para 152); Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights 
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takes on even more signifi cance when we consider how, in at least one 
CRPD signatory nation (China), the prevailing governmental policy is to 
prevent “pre-birth disabilities” via compelled abortion.110
Th ree scholarly articles in the literature stand out as lone examples 
of what scholars should focus their attentions on: (1) Maya Sabatello’s 
paper on the intersection between infertility, reproductive technologies 
and disability rights law;111 (2) Sabatello’s paper on how sexuality was 
considered in the debate on the CRPD;112 and (3) most directly, Marta 
Schaaf ’s article on sexuality in the context of the CRPD. 113 Drawing on 
of Persons with Disabilities, OHCHR, 10th Sess, CRPD/C/AUT/1, 
(2011) (Austria: “[several disability organizations] stress that people 
with disabilities also have a right to sexuality, partnership and family. 
Education and information on the issues of sterilisation and abortion is 
often insuffi  cient” at 35, para 235); Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, OHCHR, 10th Sess CRPD/C/SLV/1, (2011) (El 
Salvador: “[i]n order to enhance the eff ectiveness of the Government’s 
sexual and reproductive health programmes, it is nonetheless important to 
provide for the various means of personal expression used by persons with 
disabilities, such as Braille or Salvadoran sign language, thereby ensuring 
that everyone has the information they need to make informed decisions” 
at 29, para 153); Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
OHCHR, 9th Sess, CRPD/C/PRY/1, (2011) (Paraguay: no mention of 
sexuality issues).
110. See Yee-Fui Ng, “Disability Rights v. Quality Birth Rhetoric: Th e 
Construction of Disability in China” (2012) LAWASIA Journal 1 at 1-2. 
On forced or coerced abortion in this context in general, see Frohmader 
& Ortoleva, supra note 90.
111. Maya Sabatello, “Who’s Got Parental Rights? Th e Intersection Between 
Infertility, Reproductive Technologies, and Disability Rights Law” (2010) 
6:2 Journal of Health & Biomedical Law 227 [Sabatello, “Who’s Got 
Parental Rights?”]. See generally Stevens, supra note 11 (“[a]nother crucial 
issue in the lives of disabled people is the experience of legal intervention 
to deny parental rights. Denial of parental rights occurs across types 
of disabilities but occurs perhaps most fervently with intellectually 
and developmentally disabled people – as in many cases they lack the 
autonomy to consent to sexual activity, the choice to reproduce, and the 
ability to retain children after birth” at 16).
112. Sabatello, “Disability, Human Rights and Global Health”, supra note 1.
113. Marta Schaaf, “Negotiating Sexuality in the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities” (2011) 8:14 Sur International Journal on 
Human Rights 113.
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Articles 2 (one of the “reasonable accommodation” articles), 23, and 
26, Sabatello concludes that the CRPD provides a “possible venue to 
further advance a right to found a family through “assisted reproductive 
technologies.”114 In assessing the drafting process, Sabatello notes how 
all conversations about sexuality “raised acute debates,”115 and that, as 
a result, sexuality per se “was not elevated to a right.”116 Schaaf – who 
frontally notes that disabled sexuality is often perceived as a “threat to 
others”117 – discussed the “tension” that underlay the negotiations leading 
to the adoption of the CRPD “between eff orts to promote sexual rights 
and eff orts to protect PWDs [persons with disabilities] from unwanted 
sterilization.”118 Further, Schaaf notes that disability-focused NGOs 
“continue to be reluctant to engage sexuality,”119 but concludes that 
“[s]exual rights as a rubric of rights’ claiming will likely continue to 
grow, providing greater and better opportunities to move beyond current 
understandings of sexual citizenship to include disabled and all other 
bodies.”120
Professor Michael Stein and Professor Janet Lord have written 
eloquently about how another Article in the convention – Article 30, 
setting out social rights of participation in cultural life – “serves as a vital 
channel of engagement with society when such participation is embraced 
by the community,” and increases “self-reliance and empowerment.”121 
114. Sabatello, “Who’s Got Parental Rights?”, supra note 111 at 259.
115. Sabatello, “Disability, Human Rights and Global Health”, supra note 1 at 
manuscript 23.
116. Ibid at manuscript 25. On the opposition of the Arab Group of nations, 
the Holy See and Yemen to expanded mention of sexuality – unmoored 
from traditional marriage – see ibid at manuscript 23-24.
117. Schaaf, supra note 113 at 114.
118. Ibid at 124.
119. Ibid. 
120. Ibid at 125.
121. Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E Lord, “Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory 
Justice, and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities” (2008) 13:2 Texas Journal of Civil Liberties & Civil Rights 
167 at 182, discussed extensively in Michael L Perlin, “‘Th rough the 
Wild Cathedral Evening’: Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, 
Professor tenBroek, and the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities” 
(2008) 13:2 Texas Journal of Civil Liberties & Civil Rights 413 at 413-
16.
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Other commentators have concluded that the Convention “is regarded 
as having fi nally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to claim their 
rights, and to participate in international and national aff airs on an 
equal basis with other minority groups who have achieved specifi c treaty 
recognition and protection.”122 
Th e CRPD Committee has already begun to outline legislation and 
policies required to ensure implementation, a process that may prove 
useful in addressing the many unanswered questions posed in this paper. 
Th e Committee has worked on issuing recommendations for services and 
programs aimed at people with disabilities to assist them in informed 
decision-making, regardless of whether they are institutionalized or 
not. 123 Th ese programs would work on mainstreaming disability issues 
into legislation, and disseminating information about sexual and 
reproductive health in an accessible format for individuals who want 
to become informed about their right to engage in sexual activity.124 
Further, the Committee supports teaching sexual health to children with 
intellectual disabilities.125
If the Convention is taken seriously – if it is, in fact, more than 
122. See e.g. Kayess & French, supra note 52 (“[s]ee, for example, statements 
made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, 
and the Permanent Representative of New Zealand and Chair of the 
Ad-Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Ambassador Don Mackay, 
at a Special Event on the Convention on Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities … convened by the UN Human Rights Council, 26 
March 2007, available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/
(httpNewsByYearen)/7444B2E219117CE8C12572AA004C5701?Open
 Document” at 4, n 17).
123. UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidelines 
on Treaty-Specifi c Document to Be Submitted by State Parties Under 
Article 35, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (UN Document CRPD/C/2/3, October 2009) [Guidelines on 
Treaty-Specifi c Document], online: United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
CRPD/CRPD-C-2-3.pdf>.
124. Girlescu, supra note 3 at 21; Guidelines on Treaty-Specifi c Document, 
ibid at 123.
125. Guidelines on Treaty-Specifi c Document, ibid.
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a “paper victory”126 – then, perhaps, it can be a vehicle to uproot that 
aspect of sanism that continues to deny the institutionalized persons the 
rights to their own sexuality.127 Th roughout the CRPD, it is apparent 
that the preferences and decisions of persons with disabilities must be 
respected and promoted. Expanding on this idea of self-determination, 
it follows that decisions about sex, sexuality, and reproduction are to 
be made by the person with a disability, rather than a “caretaker” or a 
facility superintendent. Th is kind of decision-making is a core element of 
self-determination and empowerment that is promoted by the CRPD.128 
However, in order to bring about such a dramatic shift in thinking (and 
translating that to concrete action which will allow for such decisions 
to be made by persons with disabilities) on this issue, it is necessary 
that other scholars follow the lead of Professors Sabatello and Schaaf to 
126. Michael L Perlin, “‘What’s Good is Bad, What’s Bad is Good, You’ll Find 
out When You Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom’: Are the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More Th an ‘Idiot 
Wind?’” (2002) 35:1-2 U Mich JL Ref 235 (“[m]ental disability law 
is strewn with examples of ‘paper victories”’ at 246), quoting Michael 
Lottman, “Paper Victories and Hard Realities” in Valierie J Bradley & 
Gar J Clarke, eds, Paper Victories and Hard Realities: Th e Implementation of 
the Legal and Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Disabled (Washington, 
DC: Georgetown University, 1976) at 93. In the specifi c context of other 
United Nations Conventions, see Sara Dillon, “What Human Rights Law 
Obscures: Global Sex Traffi  cking and the Demand for Children” (2008) 
17:1 UCLA Women’s LJ 121 (“[a] specialized human rights convention 
does not in itself guarantee substantial change” at 154).
127. Th ere is some evidence that in other jurisdictions, parallel rights are being 
taken seriously.  See e.g. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, Nov. 
1, Art 8(1), online: Council of Europe <http://conventions.coe.int/>; as 
construed in X v Iceland, (1976) 5 DR 86 at 87 (Article 8 prohibiting 
public authorities from interfering with a person’s right “to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence” is broad enough 
to encompass an entitlement “to establish and to develop relationships 
with other human beings, especially in the emotional fi eld for the 
development and fulfi llment of one’s own personality”). Th is issue is 
discussed in Lawrence O Gostin & Lance Gable, “Th e Human Rights of 
Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application 
of Human Rights Principles to Mental Health” (2004) 63:1 Md L Rev 20 
at 94.
128. Girlescu, supra note 3 at 19.
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seriously engage this topic.129
B.  Th erapeutic Jurisprudence
Another important lens through which to view this issue is that of 
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ). Th erapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to 
look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”130 and focuses on the law’s 
infl uence on emotional life and psychological well-being.131 It suggests 
that “law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid 
imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when 
consistent with other values served by law, should attempt to bring about 
healing and wellness.”132 Th e ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence 
is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyers’ roles can 
or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential, while 
refraining from subordination of due process principles. 133 Th ere is an 
129. See e.g. Willene Holness, “Informed Consent for Sterilisation of Women 
and Girls with Disabilities in the Light of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities” (2013) 27:4 Agenda: Empowering Women 
for Gender Equity 35 (questioning whether South Africa’s sterilization 
law meets the requirements of the CRPD, and concluding that the 
enhancement of the decision-making capacities of the population 
in question will require “demystifying the sexuality of women with 
disabilities”). On how sexual health for persons with intellectual 
disabilities is a rights issue under the CRPD, see Foley & Kelly, supra note 
31 at 20.
130. Bruce J Winick, “Foreword: Th erapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on 
Dealing With Victims of Crime” (2009) 33:2 Nova L Rev 535 at 535.
131. See David B Wexler, “Practicing Th erapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal 
Soft Spots and Strategies” in Daniel P Stolle, David B Wexler & Bruce 
J Winick, eds, Practicing Th erapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping 
Profession (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000) at 45. 
132. Bruce J Winick, “A Th erapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil 
Commitment” in Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, eds, Involuntary 
Detention and Th erapeutic Jurisprudence: International Perspective on Civil 
Commitment (Great Britain: Ashgate Publishing, 2003) 23 at 26.
133. See Michael L Perlin, “‘And My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even 
Say What it is I’ve Got’: Th e Role and Signifi cance of Counsel in Right 
to Refuse Treatment Cases” (2005) 42:2 San Diego L Rev 735 at 751 
[Perlin, “Role of Counsel”]; Perlin & Lynch, “All his Sexless Patients”, 
supra note 69 at 277-78; Perlin, “Everybody is Making Love”, supra note 
46 at 510, n 139; Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians”, supra note 52 
at 1184. See also Michael L Perlin, “‘Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror’: 
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inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifi es 
how it must be resolved:  the law’s use of “mental health information 
to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice 
concerns.”134 As one of the authors (MLP) has written elsewhere, “an 
inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic 
concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”135 In its aim to use the 
law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, 
TJ has been described as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role 
of law … a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach 
to the practice of law … which emphasises psychological wellness over 
adversarial triumphalism.” 136 Th at is, TJ supports an ethic of care.137
Th e Legal Profession’s Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with 
Mental Disabilities” (2008) 69:3 U Pitt L Rev 589 at 591 [Perlin, “Sanist 
Blindness”] (discussing how TJ “might be a redemptive tool in eff orts to 
combat sanism, as a means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist façade’”); 
Bernard P Perlmutter, “George’s Story: Voice and Transformation through 
the Teaching and Practice of Th erapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School 
Child Advocacy Clinic” (2005) 17:2 St Th omas L Rev 561 at 599, n 
111; Ian Freckelton, “Th erapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and 
Misrepresented: Th e Price and Risks of Infl uence” (2008) 30:2 Th omas 
Jeff erson L Rev 575 at 585-86.
134. See David B Wexler, “Th erapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts 
of Legal Scholarship” (1993) 11:1 Behav Sci & L 17 at 21; see also 
David Wexler, “Applying the Law Th erapeutically” (1996) 5:3 Applied & 
Preventive Psychology 179.
135. Michael L Perlin, “A Law of Healing” (2000) 68:2 U Cin L Rev 407 at 
412; Michael L Perlin, “‘Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline’: 
Mental Disability Law, Th eory and Practice, Us and Th em” (1998) 31:3 
Loy LA L Rev 775 at 782.
136. Warren Brookbanks, “Th erapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical 
Framework” (2001) 8 Journal of Law & Medicine 328 at 329-30; see 
also Bruce J Winick, “Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement: 
Challenges for the TJ Lawyer” in Marjorie A Silver, ed, Th e Aff ective 
Assistance of Counsel: Practicing Law as a Healing Profession (Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2007) 341; Bruce J Winick & David B Wexler, 
“Th e Use of Th erapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: 
Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic” (2006) 13:1 Clinical L Rev 605 
at 605-06.  Th e use of the phrase dates to Carol Gilligan, In a Diff erent 
Voice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982).
137. See e.g. Winick & Wexler, supra note 136 at 605-07; David B Wexler, 
“Not Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of ) 
Professor Quinn’s Concerns about Th erapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal 
44 
 
Perlin & Lynch, Love Is Just A Four-Letter Word
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.138 
Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three Vs” as voice, validation, and 
voluntariness, 139 arguing:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of 
voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker.  If that litigant feels that 
the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s 
story, the litigant feels a sense of validation.  When litigants emerge from a legal 
proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the 
outcome.  Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in 
which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive.  Specifi cally, the 
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process 
that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that aff ects 
their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the 
future.  In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, 
or at least participating in, their own decisions. 140
Th e question to be addressed here is this: given the way we deny 
the sexuality rights of persons with disabilities, is it remotely possible 
that Professor Ronner’s vision – of voice, voluntariness and validation 
– will be fulfi lled? In a thoughtful analysis of the underlying issues, 
Professor Julie Tennille has listed multiple benefi ts of a “communicative 
climate” for consumers with regard to sexuality issues.141 Janine Benedet 
Defense Lawyering” (2007) 48:3 BCL Rev 597 at 599; Brookbanks, supra 
note 136; Gregory Baker, “Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A 
“Th erapeutic” Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes 
Calling” (2006) 28:1 Whittier Law Review 379 at 385.
138. See Bruce J Winick, Civil Commitment: A Th erapeutic Jurisprudence Model 
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005) at 161.
139. Amy D Ronner, “Th e Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education 
and Th erapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome” 
(2008) 24:4 Touro L Rev 601 at 627. On the importance of “voice,” see 
Freckelton, supra note 133 at 588.
140. Amy D Ronner, “Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: 
Th erapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles” (2002) 71:1 U Cin L 
Rev 89 at 94-95.
141. See Tennille & Wright, supra note 18 (“[h]ealthy sexual relationships can 
foster development and maintenance of new relationships, a key element 
in social integration; positive sexual partnerships can increase quality of 
life, and those with mental health conditions who maintain relationships 
often have better treatment outcomes; some research indicates that 
hospital readmission rates dropped if consumers were able to develop 
romantic relationships; and stigma of mental illness may be reduced” at  
13-14). 
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and Isabel Grant have also used a therapeutic jurisprudential fi lter in 
weighing these issues.142 Both commentators have considered how to 
defi ne “capacity to consent”143 and “engage in sexual activities,”144 and 
how to ensure that such defi nitions remain person-centered and allow 
for a “situational approach”145 to each case. Th ey write: “incapacity 
can and should be defi ned situationally – in a functional manner that 
maximizes [a person’s] sexual self-determination.”146 However, Benedet 
and Grant’s thoughtful analysis and emphasis on the individual and his 
or her self-determination – two concepts linked with dignity – have not 
been greatly expanded upon in case law or legislation so as to give life to 
the therapeutic jurisprudential lens that they employ to view these issues 
of sexuality.
Twenty years ago, one of us (MLP) wrote the following about 
sexuality issues in the domestic context, and we believe that little has 
changed in the intervening two decades:
 We must also question the therapeutic or antitherapeutic implications of 
offi  cial hospital policies that control the place, manner, and frequency with 
which such individuals can have  sexual interactions. We must consider the 
implications of these policies on ward life and their implications for patients’ 
post-hospital lives. Th ese questions are diffi  cult ones, but we must ask them 
nonetheless if we wish to formulate a thoughtful, comprehensive response to 
the wide range of questions this subject raises.147
How does this all “fi t” with the CRPD? We believe that the Convention 
 “is a document that resonates with  TJ values,”148 and that it refl ects the 
three principles articulated by Professor Ronner – voice, validation and 
voluntariness,149 by looking at law “as it actually impacts people’s lives.”150 
Each section of the  CRPD empowers persons with mental disabilities, 
and one of the major aims of  TJ is explicitly the empowerment of those 
142. Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “A Situational Approach to Incapacity and 
Mental Disability in Sexual Assault Law” (2013) 43:1 Ottawa L Rev 447.
143. Ibid at 456.
144. Ibid at 453.
145. Ibid at 466.
146. Ibid at 450. 
147. Perlin, “Beyond the Last Frontier?”, supra note 17 at 547.
148. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians”, supra note 52 at 1188.
149. Ronner, supra note 140 at 94-95.
150. Perlin, International Human Rights, supra note 7 at 21.
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whose lives are regulated by the legal system.151 Th e CRPD is, in many 
ways, a TJ blueprint. It privileges autonomy, promotes dignity, and values 
psychological health. If TJ encourages the law to “enhance [its] therapeutic 
potential,”152 enforcement of the CRPD serves that enforcement role in 
the way that persons with mental disabilities are treated with regard to 
their sexual being.  If a TJ perspective is adopted, that will also be the best 
way to ensure that the sanism that pervades the law’s treatment of persons 
with mental disabilities on questions of sexuality and sexual expression is 
rooted out of the system.153
If institutionalized persons with mental disabilities are granted the 
same sexual autonomy that the rest of us have, the former population will 
be given a voice.  If persons with mental disabilities are allowed voluntary 
sexual interaction, that, by defi nition, provides the sort of participatory 
experience that leads to a sense of voluntariness within a therapeutic 
jurisprudence framework. And together, the grant of sexual autonomy 
and the concomitant right to voluntary sexual interaction help increase 
the self-validation of those in question.
We hope that scholars and advocates take seriously the intersection 
between sexuality issues, TJ issues and human rights issues, and turn 
their attention more fully to this question in future years.
IV.  Conclusion
As society in general becomes increasingly open and direct about sex and 
sexuality, “[a]ided by the values of a consumer culture and encouraged by 
the growing visibility of sex in the public realm, many now regard sexual 
pleasure as a legitimate component of their lives.”154 Th is openness and 
151. Ibid. See also, e.g. Astrid Birgden & Michael L Perlin, “‘Where the Home 
in the Valley Meets the Damp Dirty Prison’: A Human Rights Perspective 
on Th erapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Forensic Psychologists in 
Correctional Settings” (2009) 14:4 Aggression & Violent Behavior 256. 
152. See e.g. Perlin, “Role of Counsel”, supra note 133 at 751.
153. Perlin, “Neonaticide”, supra note 48 at 25. On “[t]he peculiar interplay 
between  sanism and sexuality” see Perlin, “Everybody is Making Love”, 
supra note 46 at 506; see generally Perlin, “Sanist Blindness”, supra note 
133 at 591 (discussing how TJ “might be a redemptive tool in eff orts to 
combat  sanism, as a means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist façade”).
154. Raie Goodwach, “Sex Th erapy: Historical Evolution, Current Practice. 
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directness must be allowed to extend to persons with disabilities if full 
equality for this population is to be achieved.
Given the lack of statutory authority, case law, and scholarly articles 
within this topic, we can only off er conclusions based on our beliefs on 
the rights of persons with disabilities to their sexual autonomy. Th ere is 
minimal research to analyze, few statutes to interpret, and few articles 
to debate; rather, we must rely on the school of thought that upholds 
equality in every aspect of life for persons with disabilities. Th e CRPD 
and the guidelines of therapeutic jurisprudence off er us a starting point 
from which to off er recommendations for scholars, lawmakers, clinicians, 
and those with mental disabilities.
First, sexual issues must be seen as multi-textured, and the meaning 
of “sex” must be carefully defi ned.
Second, we ignore cultural attitudes at our own risk. 
Th ird, many of the critical issues – behavioural, legal, social, and 
political – remained unanswered, in large part because of the taboos that 
surround this entire area of law, policy, and social inquiry. Th is all remains 
very under-discussed because we are still so astonishingly uncomfortable 
thinking about the questions at hand. We desire to close our eyes to the 
reality that persons with mental disabilities are sexual beings, and close 
our minds to the fact that their sexuality may be much more like “ours” 
than it is diff erent.
Fourth, the UN Convention – fi nally – forces us to reconsider how 
myopic we continue to be about these issues, and realize that sexuality 
rights are rights that must be enforced.
Fifth, application of a therapeutic jurisprudence lens to this 
question forces us to confront how the core principles of TJ are regularly 
disregarded in our social responses to these issues, and that the three V’s 
articulated by Professor Ronner are rarely, if ever, honoured. 
Sixth, the use of the TJ fi lter – in the context of the articulated 
principles of international human rights law – off ers us a means of 
approaching these questions in a new and, potentially, socially redemptive 
Part I” (2005) 26:3 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Family Th erapy 
155 at 157; see also Appel, supra note 36 at 154 (on the fundamentality of 
sexual pleasure as a right).
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way, and in a way that, optimally, erases sanist attitudes.
In Love Is Just a Four- Letter Word, Bob Dylan characterizes love, in the 
context of the relationship about which he is singing as “unmentionable 
by name.”155 Love and sex have forever been “unmentionable by name” 
when we discuss persons with mental disabilities, especially those who 
are institutionalized, notwithstanding the revolutions that we have seen 
in the past four decades: sexual revolutions, civil rights revolutions, 
and disability rights revolutions.156 And these issues – in the context 
of this paper – have become even more pointed in the years since the 
international human rights movement and the mental disability law 
movement have been joined, and the CRPD ratifi ed.157  Perhaps, now, we 
can fi nally devote to this area of law and policy the attention it deserves. 
155. Dylan, supra note 20.
156. Perlin, International Human Rights, supra note 7 at 547.
157. See e.g. Michael L Perlin & Eva Szeli, “Mental Health Law and Human 
Rights: Evolution and Contemporary Challenges” in Michael Dudley, 
Derrick Silove & Fran Gale, eds, Mental Health and Human Rights: Vision, 
Praxis, and Courage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 80 at 98.
